There is increasing evidence that fairness and generosity are not exclusive human traits. Indeed, several experiments on chimpanzees, monkeys and other mammals show an inequity-aversion behavior. Namely, if some valuable resource, e.g. food, is unevenly divided between two individuals, the one who gets a smaller share may reject the reward, and, in some cases, there can even be an attempt of the animal with the larger share at equalizing the division. Therefore, animals can deliberately lower their gain in name of an apparent sense of fairness. Here we show the emergence of generosity in a resource-gathering-and-sharing game inspired by animal behavior. The players act greedily, that is, they try to individually maximize only their personal income. Nonetheless, the analytical solution of the model shows that three optimal behaviors emerge depending on conditions. Besides the obvious case when players are selfish in their choice of resource division, there are conditions under which both the players are generous. Moreover, we also found a range of situations in which one selfish player exploits another generous individual, for the satisfaction of both players. Our results show that inequity aversion is favored by three factors: a long time horizon over which the players try to optimize their own game, by the similarity among players in their ability of performing the resource-gathering task, as well as by the availability of resources in the environment. These concurrent requirements lead to identify necessary conditions for the emergence of generosity.
Introduction
between being selfish and keep most of them, or being generous and equalize the resources among the members of the community. Again, generosity is a short-term inefficient strategy, but it is often observed in nature. Some examples are the food division in chimpanzees and other primates [8, 9, 10, 11] , the blood sharing in vampire bats [12, 13] , or the cooperative breeding in birds and fishes [14, 15] .
Generous food division can be viewed as an instance of animal cooperation and biological altruism, subjects that have a long tradition in evolutionary biology [16, 17, 18] . Darwin himself already noticed that altruism seems to be in contrast with the natural selection theory, since the altruistic act consists in a decrease of the donor fitness [19] . The most successful classical attempts to explain this apparent dilemma are kin selection [20, 21, 22] , reciprocity [23] , repression of competition [24] , or ideas based on group selection [25] . All these theories tackle the cooperation dilemma from the evolutionary point of view, addressing the question on how natural selection has led to a successful "cooperative phenotype", i.e. having a higher fitness than the one of defectors. The natural framework to describe this kind of processes is evolutionary game theory, where one looks for the conditions in which the cooperation is stable against the emergence of defectors [26, 27] .
The present work is based on a different approach: we assume that animals have the ability to learn and change their strategies in the most efficient way for their survival in a given environment. This allows us to move the focus from the time scale of the evolution of a large population to the scale of an individual life span, who interact with relatively few other individuals within its community. In particular, the behavior that we focus on is generosity, defined as the choice to share resources with a partner in equal parts (effectively, an instance of second-order inequity aversion), and we study when it can emerge in the context of optimal-control theory and decision-making problems. Adopting this perspective, the mathematical description moves from evolutionary games to Markov decision processes, [28] , and, more precisely, Markov games [29, 30] . In this framework, agents know the environmental state in which they are, and can choose actions according to a policy. Specifically, here animals can choose to divide resources through a generous or selfish action, selected according to the environmental conditions that they perceive. As a consequence of these actions, the agents receive rewards, i.e. the resource, and the game moves to a new environmental state which depends on the chosen action. Each agent wants to find the policy that maximizes its resource income within a given time horizon. It is important to stress that individuals are "greedy", meaning that they are interested in obtaining the largest possible personal gain, without considering the resource income of their partners. This clearly implies that, if one were looking at the immediate reward only, it would be always optimal to be selfish. However, since individuals are interested in the return within a certain time horizon, generosity can provide advantages in the future, becoming, possibly, the most efficient strategy even for "greedy" players. In the next section we introduce a simple Markov game which is built aiming at the most simple possible description of resource-gathering and sharing tasks in animal communities. Specifically, it tries to keep the basic features that drive the choice between generosity and selfishness. The model allows for analytical solution and, albeit its simplicity, exhibits a rich phenomenology of the optimal strategy depending on the parameters. Specifically, three different phases, corresponding to generous, exploitative and selfish behavior, can be discerned.
A minimal decision-making model for resource gathering and sharing
The resource-gathering and sharing game is performed by two animals/players, whose only purpose is to acquire as many resources as possible for themselves. At each iteration of the game (which we are going to call also "episode"), one of the two players is selected to be the proposer, p, box (a) of Figure 1 : it will be the active individual who carries out a certain task to acquire resources. The other player, called the bystander, b, remains passive until the end of the iteration. The model features a degree of specialization of the players, such that at every iteration, one individual can be consistently more likely to play as proposer than the other individual. Specifically, the first player can be selected with probability (1 + s)/2. The parameter s ∈ [−1, 1] can be interpreted as the specialization of the first player with respect to the second one for the given task: s = 1 means that the first player will always perform the task, while, s = 0 defines a symmetric case where both can be chosen with the same probability. This is motivated by findings in field studies, where, for example, the degree of dominance within the community can determine the frequency at which animals perform resource-gathering tasks. After being selected, the proposer performs the task, Figure 1b , which consists in acquiring a certain amount of resource R = a · h p , depending on the abundance of the resource in the environment a, and an internal variable of the proposer h p . The variable h can be identified with the player health. In the sake of simplicity, we consider h to be a binary variable: h ∈ {0, 1}. The value h = 0 defines an exhausted state, who will not gather any resource, while h = 1 a healthy one. Typically, individuals that get food are also the ones that have more decision power in the resource sharing [12, 9] . Therefore we let the same player that has performed the task also to choose how to share the resource with the bystander. The resource-division stage, Figure 1c , consists in a dictator game [31] . The proposer can choose two actions: splitting the resource R in equal parts, such that both the proposer and the bystander get r p = r b = R/2, or being selfish by keeping a larger fraction r p = R/2(1 + δ). The free parameter Figure 1 : Illustration of one temporal step of the resource-gathering-sharing model. Box (a): one of the two players is chosen to be the proposer, labeled with p, with a certain probability depending on the first-player specialization s ∈ [−1, 1]. The other individual becomes the bystander, b. Box (b): the proposer performs the resource gathering task, acquiring a given amount of resource R depending on its internal variable h p , which can be thought as its health, and the resource abundance a. Box (c): playing a dictator game, the proposer chooses how to divide the resource with the bystander. It can either split R in equal parts, r p = r b = R/2, or be selfish and keep a larger fraction of resource, r p = R/2(1 + δ), where δ ∈ (0, 1]. The proposer strategy is determined by its policy π p , i.e. the probability of playing the generous action and split the resource in equal parts. Box (d): finally, each player updates its health, h i , as a function of the received resource fraction r i . Time horizon δ ∈ (0, 1], called inequity, indicates how much large is the selfish-choice profit for the proposer at the expense of the bystander, r b = R/2(1 − δ). The strategy of a player, i.e. being "generous" or "selfish", is encoded by the policy π, which defines the probability of playing the equal action. This is the parameter that each individual can control in order to maximize the amount of obtained resource. The final step consists in updating the health according to the received fraction of resource r, Figure 1d . One simple choice to express the health dependency on r is the Heaviside step function f (r) = H(r − θ), which is 1 if r ≥ θ, or 0 if r < θ. In order to be healthy, the player has to receive an amount of resource larger than the threshold θ, which represents the minimal food ration that a player needs to be in good shape.
The objective function to maximize for the player i is an exponentially discounted return:
which is averaged over the stochastic game evolution, the player policy π i , and the other player policy π −i . The random variable r (t)
i indicates the fraction of resource obtained at the iteration t of the model, and γ ∈ [0, 1), the so-called discount factor, determines the value of future rewards, such that increasing γ, the player gives more importance to what it is going to earn at future time steps. Since 1 − γ can be interpreted as the probability that the game ends at each iteration, it sets the average length of a game being (1 − γ) −1 , the so-called time horizon, defining the number of episodes over which players want to maximize the return. Each individual can control its own policy π i affecting the outcome of resource fraction r (t) i , both for himself and the other individual. Here, solving the problem for the player i means finding the policy π i which maximizes its own profit G i by knowing that the other player j is trying to optimize at the same time G j . The obtained optimal policies belong to a Nash equilibrium: any unilateral change of strategy by a single player would reduce the payoff. Here we also want to stress that the Markov property of the model implies that players take decisions only on the basis of present the state, and independently on previous decisions or game history. This problem can be formalized using Bellman optimality equation as shown in the Methods. It turns out that the model admits analytical solution, and we were able to find the optimal strategies π * i depending on the parameters of the model, as shown below.
Selfishness region
In eq ui ty Sp ec ia liz at io n (1) as a function of the three model parameters: the player specialization s, the discount factor γ, and the inequity of the selfish choice δ. Looking at the panel (a), starting from the left plot, the red volume is defined by Equation (2), and represents the region of parameters such that the selfish strategy is optimal: π * 1 = 0, π * 2 = 0. The blue volume shown in the central diagram, which rests on the selfish block, defines the "exploitation" phase: π * 1 = 0, π * 2 = 1, Equation (3). Above these two regions, the optimal strategy is the generous one, π * 1 = 1, π * 2 = 1, represented by the green volume in the third plot, Equation (4).
Results

Inequity aversion is a matter of time horizon and player specialization
Even though each player wants to greedily maximize its own profit, the generous strategy, i.e. π * i = 1, turns out to be the most efficient one in a broad region of the parameter space. To intuitively understand why, one must note that a fair resource division can result in a higher long-term reward for the proposer. Indeed, the generous choice provides more food to the other player, who has a higher chance to be "healthy" at the end of the episode (this can or cannot happen depending on the model parameters). As a consequence, if it will play as proposer at future episodes, it could gather a larger amount of resource which will be shared with the former proposer. This benefit typically disappears for the selfish choice: the other player gets few resources becoming "exhausted", which, in turn, implies that the amount of food that it could get at future gathering tasks will be zero. Therefore the optimal strategy must be a balance between this long-term benefit that a generous strategy can provide, and the immediate higher profit given by a selfish division.
Before describing the optimal solution, it is important to note a useful symmetry of the model: the game is invariant by changing the sign of the player-specialization s and exchanging the first with the second player. This allows us to consider only half of the player-specialization domain s ∈ [0, 1]: all the results at negative s can be immediately recovered by taking the result for the positive s and inverting the players. Figure 2 shows which strategy maximizes the objective function (1) varying the three free parameters s, δ, γ, and considering only half of the specialization interval for the reason described above. The role of the resource abundance, a, and the minimal food threshold, θ, are discussed in the next section, and here fixed at a = 1, and θ = 1/2. Three distinct phases emerge as optimal strategies: selfishness, where both the players choose to keep a larger fraction of resource, exploitation, where one player is selfish and the other generous, and the case of two fair individuals, generosity. As derived in section 3 of Supplemental Material, the range of parameters in which being selfish is optimal, π * 1 = 0, π * 2 = 0, is given by the following inequality:
which defines the red volume in the Figure 2a . As the intuition suggests, the selfish behavior emerges when players give much more importance to the short-term profit, i.e. having a sufficiently small discount factor γ. Consistently, in the extreme case of γ = 0, where each player considers only the immediate reward, the selfish behavior is always optimal.
A different scenario appears in the following region of parameters, represented in the second plot of Figure 2b in blue:
Here what is optimal for the first player is being selfish, while for the second one being generous, π * 1 = 0, π * 2 = 1. The two inequalities above also imply that s > δ (by verifying that the left-hand term is less than the right-hand one). Therefore, if there is a strong asymmetry between the individuals, i.e. the first is much more specialized, playing as proposer with probability p > (1 + δ)/2, a dominance relationship of one player over the other can emerge. Taking advantage of the model symmetry, and substituting s → −s in Equation (3), one can immediately recover the case in which the two roles are inverted: π * 1 = 1, π * 2 = 0, that exists for s < −δ, i.e. a second player more specialized than the first one. Finally, for a sufficiently large discount factor, the generous behavior can be the more rewarding strategy,
This region is shown in green in the third plot of Figure 2c , which in the limit γ → 1 becomes the optimal strategy for each choice of the other parameters.
The panel (a) of Figure 3 is useful to summarize the results discussed so far. It represents a section of the threedimensional phase diagram at fixed inequity δ = 1/2, therefore describing all the games in which the selfish resource division is 3/4R for the proposer and 1/4R for the bystander. It is clear that the emergence of inequity aversion, i.e. the generous strategy, is favored by a high discount factor, that is when players give more importance to the future rewards that a healthy mate can provide. However, if the player specialization is sufficiently large, even for high γ, the game can enter the blue area. In such a case, the first agent plays as proposer much more frequently than the second one, taking control of the game: it can be selfish because the potential future profit provided by the other player becomes low. At the same time, the second player is going to be the bystander with very high probability, and therefore it has to play generously (in the unlikely case of being selected as proposer) in order to make the first one in a healthy state and receive at least 1/4 at the next resource divisions. Finally, when the discount factor goes below the line defined by Equation (2), both the players start to be selfish, having an interest in maximizing the short-term profit. Note that here the selfish strategy is always optimal if γ < 1/2, or, equivalently, the number of episodes that the players expect to play, i.e. the time horizon (1 − γ) −1 , is less that 2. The limit case of δ = 1 is shown in panel (b) of Figure 3 . Here the choice is between a fair division and keeping all the resource. Since the gain of the selfish division increases with respect the previous case, the region associated with generosity reduces, but does not disappear. Differently, exploitation does not longer represent an optimal behavior, because the bystander of a selfish division does not receive anything, and therefore it is not interested in keeping the other player healthy.
The role of resource abundance
Environmental factors affect the amount of resources in the habitat, resulting in different outcomes of a gathering task, which are independent of the animal "health" or its ability to fulfill the task. Moreover, changes of the available food amount can have strong effects on the sharing behavior, as shown, for instance, by chimpanzees in the Taï National Park, which are more generous when the prey is large, typically an adult of a Colobus monkeys, with respect when they capture infants [9] . In our minimal model, a is the free parameter that can describe the quantity of resource provided by the environment. The role that it plays in determining the optimal strategy is coupled with θ, i.e. the minimal quantity of food that a player needs to be healthy (both the two parameters are kept fixed in the previous section, a = 1, θ = 1/2). Indeed, they determine how the health is updated: for example, high abundance and low food threshold should lead more easily to healthy players, and, in turn, this can change the optimal policies. As shown in section 4 of Supplementary Material, the optimal solution is controlled by the ratio between the two parameters through the following inequalities:
Necessary conditions for generosity:
If they are satisfied, the optimal behavior is exactly described by the relations shown in the previous section: (2), (3), (4) . Otherwise, if one of the two inequalities is violated, the selfish behavior (π * i = 0) is the most efficient behavior for each parameter choice.
Intuitively, this happens because, if (5) is true, the generous resource division leads to a healthy partner (the health-update function, Figure 1d , reads H[a/2 − θ] = 1), while the selfish one drives him to exhaustion, H[a/2(1 − δ) − θ] = 0. This provide the long-term benefit for the equal division (and not for the unequal one) described at the beginning of the previous section, which is the key to have generosity. On the contrary, if the environment provides too few resources such that (5) is broken, a < 2θ, then there is no enough food to make the other player healthy: the long term benefit disappears, implying that it is always convenient to keep as much food as possible through the unequal division. Also in the case of a very rich environment, i.e. a ≥ 2θ/(1 − δ), the optimal policy is always being selfish. In this case, there is enough food to make the bystander always healthy, even as a recipient of the selfish division. As a consequence, the long term benefit of having a healthy partner is now given not only by the equal, but also by the unequal division. Since this latter sharing additionally provides a larger amount of immediate resource, being selfish is always the most advantageous strategy.
Discussion
Our model shows that generosity can emerge as the optimal strategy of a model for resource gathering and sharing tasks in animals. Importantly, it emerges even though the agents are interested in maximizing only their personal income, i.e. they are "greedy". However, a fair resource division can be more rewarding than the selfish one in the long run, specifically, when the inequality (4) is satisfied. The underlying mechanism is that a fair player provides more food to the partner, increasing its health and, thus, making it more efficient at gathering resources in the future, that can be potentially shared with the player. It is worth noting that the fact that the resource-sharing choice affects the outcome of the future gathering tasks (through the health update) is crucial in order to observe generous behavior. Indeed, if one study a "one-shot" sharing task, called dictator game [31] , being selfish is always optimal (see the fifth section of Supplementary Material for details). To better understand this observation, one can decouple the two tasks by introducing a random component in the health-update function. For example, with probability η, the player health is chosen with equal probability to be 0 or 1, while, with probability 1 − η, the step function used above is employed. As shown in section 5 of Supplementary Material, as η increases, the selfish strategy tends to be the optimal strategy for a larger region of parameters, and becomes the only solution for η = 1.
The choice of keeping the model as simple as possible allows us to solve the Bellman optimality equation, and to identify general rules that govern the fair-selfish dilemma. First, increasing the discount factor γ, and therefore putting more weights on the rewards obtained in the future, favors generosity. This parameters can also be interpreted as the probability that the game repeats at the next step, implying that (1 − γ) −1 is the expected number of episodes to be played, i.e. the time horizon. Therefore, the longer an agent expects to play, the larger is the parameter space associated to inequity aversion. The second crucial quantity is the symmetry between the players, described by the specialization parameter s. It can have two interpretations. The first one is how much more frequently a player performs the task with respect to the other, for example because of dominance ranks within the community. The alternative interpretation is about the ability in performing the task, in particular the difference in the probability of success of gathering resource between the two players. It appears that a strong player asymmetry disfavors generosity, possibly leading to the dominance of one player over the other, if (3) is satisfied. Finally, a crucial role is played by the resource abundance: the generous behavior is possible only if the environment provides an amount of resources within the window defined by (5) .
An important consideration is in order about the simple rule discussed above: generosity is favored by a long time horizon. This closely resembles the condition for cooperation in reciprocity [23] . For example, in the classical setting of reciprocity, which identifies Tit for Tat as the cooperative strategy in an iterated prisoner dilemma, cooperation emerges if the probability of interacting again with the same partner (the counterpart of γ) is sufficiently large [26, 27] . This analogy can be traced back to a similar way of thinking about generosity: it emerges from greedy players who want to maximize their personal fitness/return, without considering, for example, the fitness of relatives as in kin selection. Moreover, in both models, generosity can be chosen because it provides an advantage in the long run, while being inefficient at the present time. However, there are substantial differences with our approach here. First, the fundamental mechanism that induces cooperation is different: here it is based on the feedback that the resource sharing has on the next gathering task through the health variable. In reciprocity the key is to recognize the partner and to remember its choice at the previous step, allowing agents to play tit-for-tat. Second, here we focus on a specific instance of cooperation: the choice of dividing acquired resources in equal parts, i.e. second order inequity aversion. To better understand how this behavior is related with classical theories of cooperation, it is useful to introduce the cost in fitness for the generous action, c, and the benefit b that this action provides to the recipient. If one tries to compute these two quantities for inequity aversion, it finds c = Rδ/2, which is the difference between what a player can potentially acquire by being selfish and what it actually gains by the equal sharing, and b = Rδ/2, the recipient receives exactly what the donor looses. This condition, c = b, typically does not allow the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games. For example, in the seminal work of Martin Nowak [27] , five mechanism for cooperation are introduced and, for each of them, an inequality states when the strategy is evolutionary stable. In reciprocity, for example, the inequality reads γ > c/b, where γ is the probability that there will be another interaction with the same player. If c = b cooperation is no longer stable neither for reciprocity nor for all the other four mechanisms. The last important difference is that, as already stressed above, instead of looking at generosity as an evolutionary outcome, the present work recovers generosity as the best strategy of a decision-making problem that animals can learn through trial and error. A crucial advantage of the latter approach is that learning works on much faster time scales than evolution. This allows individuals to modify strategies during their life time in response to varying environmental conditions, such as abundances of resources in their habitat or changes in the social ranks within a community.
The model is clearly oversimplified to address real situations and many additions are conceivable. Obviously, the drawback of increasing the model complexity is that the system of equation becomes analytically unsolvable. Nonetheless, it can be approached with numerical methods, such as dynamic programming techniques [28] . Just to mention some interesting generalizations, more than two agents can be considered, each with a private policy about the fraction of resource to share with the other players. Also, the health space can be expanded including intermediate states between the fully healthy and the exhausted player, and more than two choices for the resource sharing can be added. In this direction, recent works from the DeepMind lab [32, 33, 34 ] study dynamics of cooperation-competition in Markov games inspired by real systems, such as a pair of wolves that has to catch a prey in a grid-world environment, or several agents who have to harvest resources whose spawning rate drops to zero if all the resources have been gathered. This goes in the direction of adding more realistic details to the game: the system complexity increases, and analytical approaches are no longer possible. However, there are extremely powerful tools and algorithms to efficiently find rewarding strategies. Most of them are based on (deep) reinforcement learning [35, 36] . The problem of generosity and cooperation is just one among a huge number of systems in which Markov games, together with reinforcement learning techniques, can find application. Notably, this framework is also at the basis of several recent successes in "artificial intelligence", e.g. [37, 38] .
The concept of reinforcement learning and its application in Markov decision processes allows us to introduce another important remark. These kind of algorithms are, generally speaking, grounded on the idea of trial and error. Importantly, a lot of behavioral and neuroscientific evidence claims that animals can learn using very similar processes, in particular temporal difference algorithms [39, 40] . This leads to the biologically reasonable assumption that animals usually learn efficient strategies for the daily-tasks performed in nature. This can include how to acquire and divide resources, implying that the generous (or the selfish) sharing can be viewed as the optimal policy of a decision-making problem.
Inequity aversion is one of the pillars of morality. We believe that the insights coming from ethology, decision-making theory and reinforcement learning will turn out to be crucial in our understanding of morality in humans, animals and machines.
Methods
Bellman optimality equation
The model can be described as an extension of a Markov Decision Process [41, 28] for more than one agent: a Markov game [29, 30] . It is defined by a set of states S, and a set of actions that each player can take A = A 1 ⊗ A 2 (for the two-player case). From each state s ∈ S and set of actions a = (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A the game jumps to a new state s according to the transition probabilities p(s |s, a) ∈ P D(S), and each player gets a reward according to the reward function r(s, a) ∈ R 2 . The player i chooses which action to take from a given state with a probability given by its policy: π i (a i |s) ∈ P D(A i ). In Table 3 it is shown how the model can be cast into this framework (see section 1 of the Supplementary material for a more detailed explanation.) To compute the optimal strategy, the key quantity to consider is the quality function
i = a i , which is the expected return 1h (e, ∅) (
(∅, e) (0, 0) q to 1t, 1 − q to 2t 2t (∅, u) (0, 0) q to 1t, 1 − q to 2t Table 3 : The model is composed of four states identified by the individual playing as proposer, 1 or 2, and its health, h for a healthy player, t for an exhausted one. For each state, the proposer can choose an equal, e, or an unequal sharing u, while the bystander can only play a fictitious action ∅. For each state-action pair the rewards are shown in the third column, and the transition probabilities in the fourth one, where q = (1 + s)/2 is the probability to choose the first player as proposer. For more details, see Section 1 of SM (1) of the player i starting from the state S (1) = s, choosing the action A
(1) i = a i , by playing with a policy is π i , and by knowing the policy of the other player π −i . The optimization problem of maximizing the return (1) by knowing that also the other player is optimizing its return simultaneously, can be solved through the following Bellman optimality equation (derived in the second section of SM):
where the optimal policy from the state s is deterministic and consists in choosing the action that maximizes the best quality Q * i (s, a i ).
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Generosity, selfishness and exploitation as optimal greedy strategies for resource sharing S1 Resource-gathering-sharing model as a Markov game Let us first describe the model at fixed resource abundance a = 1 and food threshold θ = 1/2. The Markov game has four states, each of them characterized by the agent who is playing as proposer and by its health, Figure S1a . The following notation will be used: S = {1h, 2h, 1t, 2t}, where the first letter specifies the agent playing as proposer, and the second one its health: h for a healthy individual (h i = 1) and t for a tired/exhausted one (h i = 0). From the states 1h and 1t, there are two possible actions, (e, ∅) and (u, ∅). The first element is the action of the first agent, who is playing as proposer, and can choose to be equal/generous e, or unequal/selfish u. This choice is determined by its policy π 1h , which is the probability of selecting the generous action from the state 1h (π 1t from 1t). The second passive player can only choose a single fictitious action ∅. From 2h and 2t the choice is in the hand of the second player, and therefore the actions are (∅, e) and (∅, u), which are determined by the policies π 2h or π 2t . Each action from the states 1t and 2t (i.e. with an exhausted proposer) provides zero reward/resource-fraction for both the players r = (0, 0), where the pair indicates the reward for the first and the second player respectively, as indicated in Figure S1a in bold. The rewards are instead (1/2, 1/2) for a healthy proposer who plays generously, and r(1h, (u, 0)) = 1/2(1 + δ, 1 − δ) and r(2h, (0, u)) = 1/2(1 − δ, 1 + δ) for the selfish actions of a healthy proposer. The transition probabilities are determined by the health-update function and the stochastic selection of the proposer. First, one has to consider that each action leads to a state where the new proposer is the first player, 1h or 1t, with probability q = (1 + s)/2, and to 2h or 2t with probability 1 − q . Second, the action leads to 1h or 1t depending on the reward received by the first player: if it is greater or equal than θ = 1/2, then the health-update function leads to a healthy player, and 1h is chosen (and similarly the choice between 2h or 2t depends on the resource fraction received by the second player). Note that the the generous action of a healthy proposer always leads to a healthy-state (1h or 2h), since both the player receive an amount of food equal to the minimal food threshold θ = 1/2, while the transitions from a selfish-action can lead to an exhausted state (1t or 2t), if the bystander is chosen to be the new proposer. Importantly, in this minimal setting, if the game moves to an exhausted-state, it can no longer jump to 1h or 2h. See Section S5 for a more general model, which introduces a probability of health recovery independent of the received resource fraction. A generic resource abundance a > 0 and food threshold θ > 0 change the reward function and the transition probabilities. Specifically, all the rewards are multiplied by the parameter a, while the transitions show four configurations depending on inequalities involving the ratio θ/a, Figure S1b . In the first case, 2θ/a < 1 − δ, the food threshold is less than the reward of the bystander in a selfish division (performed by a healthy proposer), and, therefore, both the unequal and the equal choice (of healthy proposers) always lead to two healthy players. In the second case, the food threshold and the resource abundance are set in such a way that the only case when there is exhaustion is being the bystander of unequal division. Therefore, as a consequence of a selfish action, with probability 1 − q, the game moves in one of the two bottom states (as in the special case a = 1 and θ = 1/2 discussed above). When θ becomes larger that the reward of the generous division, also the equal action leads to poor-health players (third case). Finally, in the fourth case, when θ > a(1 + δ)/2, the resource abundance in the environment is so scarce that even the resource of a selfish proposer does not allow it to be healthy.
S2 Bellman optimality equation for Markov games
As mentioned in the main text, the aim of each player is to maximize its exponentially discounted return by tuning its policy. This objective function is defined as:
where ρ t (s) is the probability that the game is in the state s at time t, and all the other quantities have been introduced in the Method section of the main text. By taking advantage of the Markov property, one can express the state probability density evolution by considering the following Chapman-Kolmogorov equation:
Here it is useful to introduce the average residence time in the state s: η(s) = t γ t ρ t (s), and, from now on, to consider Equation (S1) dependent on it instead of the state probability density and the summation over the episodes. The optimization problem here is to maximize the discounted return of each player with respect to its policies. However, one has to be careful that there is an implicit dependence on them through η(s). This can be approached by considering the average residence time as a new independent variable, maximizing also over it, and imposing a Lagrangian constraint over the following expression, which can be derived by using the Markov process dynamics (S2):
The Lagrangian function to maximize is then:
where φ i (s) is the Lagrangian multiplier of the average residence time dynamics (S3), and λ i (s) the multipliers of the policy normalization. One has to notice that the functional is linear in the policies, implying that the expression does not have a stationary point (the maximum is at the boundary of the policy domain), and imposing the derivative of the functional equal to zero does not lead to any solutions. To overcome this problem, one can add a regularization term, such as the entropy of the policies:
where the parameter controls the weight of the entropy with respect the original functional. At the end of the calculation, one can impose the limit → 0 to recover the non-regularized solution.
The stationary point can be found by setting the derivatives of F ( ) i with respect to π i (a i |s) and η(s) equal to zero. This resembles the concept to Nash equilibrium: the solution is the policy that maximizes the return, and from which a change in the strategy is not convenient. Note that, in general, the system can have more than one solution, as discussed in our specific case later. In that case the best strategy (the Nash equilibrium) is the one that has larger return among the solutions. The derivative with respect to the policy i leads to the following expression for the best policy:
where the Lagrangian constraint λ i (s) has been chosen in such a way that the policy is normalized, and Q * i (s, a i ) is defined as:
It can be proven that the Lagrangian multiplier φ i (s) is the maximal return (S1) that the player i can expect starting the game from the state s, also called the best value function, which, from now on, it is going to be indicated also with V * i (s). As a consequence, the variable Q * i (s, a i ) is the best quality function of the player i, which corresponds to the maximal return of a game starting from the state s and choosing the action a i . The derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to the average residence time η(s) leads to an expression for the value function:
Finally, imposing the limit → 0 to the expressions (S6), (S7), (S8), one recovers the optimality Bellman equations:
S3 Exact solution of the model
In this section, the optimal policies of the gathering-sharing model are derived through the Bellman equations (S9). Since there are four states {1h, 2h, 1t, 2t} and two players, there are eight equations for the value functions. For example, the ones of the first player read:
(S10) The equations for the second player can be obtained by taking advantage of the model symmetry: it is invariant by exchanging the two players, i = 1 → i = 2, i = 2 → i = 1, and the sign of the player specialization s → −s (or, equivalently, q → 1 − q). Looking at the last two equations of the system, it is easy to see that the values of the "tired" states are all zero: V * 1 (1t) = V * 1 (2t) = 0, and, similarly, the ones of the second player: V * 2 (1t) = V * 2 (2t) = 0. After some straightforward mathematical manipulations, and adding the expression for the best policy, one can derive the following set of equations for the first player:
where H[x] stands for the Heaviside theta function, which is 1 for a positive argument and 0 otherwise. The system above, together with the other three equations for the second player, defines a closed system of non-linear equations, which can be solved as follows. One has to define two variables, x 1 = γ(1−q)V * 1 (2h)−δ/2, and x 2 = γqV * 2 (1h)−δ/2, which are the arguments of the policies of the two players:
. Therefore, it follows that if x i is greater than zero, than the optimal strategy of the player i is being generous (or selfish if x i < 0). Note that this quantity is the difference between two terms. The first one is the advantage of playing generously, γ(1 − q)V * 1 (2h): since the action has led to a healthy second player, if it is chosen as proposer at the next step (with probability 1 − q), the first player will get a return equal to V * 1 (2h). The factor γ says that this profit must be discounted because it will be obtained at the next round. The second term, δ/2, is instead the immediate gain of the selfish action. Therefore the best strategy can be seen as the balance of these two terms. By expressing the system (S11) as a function of the two new variables, one gets:
and two similar equations for the second player, which, again, can be derived from the system above by using the model symmetry. At this point, one can consider four different cases depending on the signs of x 1 and x 2 . Indeed, once x 1 or x 2 are known to be positive ore negative, the system becomes easily solvable.
S3.1 Generous phase
Let us first consider x 1 > 0 or x 2 > 0. This implies that the policies are π * ih = 1, which corresponds to a generous strategy for both the players. By solving the system (S12) under this assumption, one finds x 1 = (γ(1 − q) − δ + δγ)/(2(1 − γ)), and x 2 = (γq − δ + δγ))/(2 (1 − γ) ). This two expressions must be consistent with the initial choice about the sign of the two variables, leading to the following condition of existence:
which defines the range of parameters in which the generous solution exists as an optimal strategy. It is also useful for later considerations to derive the values of this strategy, which, for the first player, read: V * 1,gen (1h) = V * 1,gen (2h) = 1/ (2(1 − γ) ).
S3.2 Selfish phase
In the case of negative x 1 and x 2 the two players play selfishly. Under such a condition, the explicit expressions of the two variables are x 1 = (γ(1 − q) − δ)/(2(1 − γ(1 − q))) and x 2 = (γq − δ)/(2(1 − γq)), leading to the following condition of existence:
and the following values:
It can be noted that this condition of existence can overlap with that one of the generous phase, implying the presence of two solutions. This can be interpreted that, if both the individuals are playing generously, it is not convenient for a player to change the action (its value function will be lower), and, at the same time, it is not convenient for an agent to deviate from the selfish-selfish scenario. However, one can evaluate which is the best situation by comparing the value functions. In particular, the generous strategy is the optimal one if V *
It is easy to show that this is always the case within the region of parameters in which the two solutions overlap, 2δ 1−|s|+2δ < γ < 2δ 1+|s| . Therefore, it can be concluded that when the inequality (S13) is satisfied, it is always more convenient to play generously, while, the selfish strategy is optimal within the following region:
which is the difference between (S14) and (S13).
S3.3 Exploitation phase
The final two cases consist in a player being selfish and the other generous. Here we consider only the case x 1 < 0 or x 2 > 0, i.e. "the first player is exploiting the second one". The opposite case can be obtained through the model symmetry: the two players are exchanged (and therefore the second player is the selfish one), and the sign of s is switched. By solving the system, one can found
, and x 2 = (γq − δ)/(2(1 − γq)), and the following condition of existence:
S4 Generic resource abundance and food threshold
Generic values of a and θ affect the model on two sides: the rewards are all multiplied by the factor a, and the transition probabilities change as shown in Figure S1b . Let us first focus on the top-right configuration of Figure  S1b : 1 − δ < 2θ/α ≤ 1. In such a region, the transition probabilities are the same of the case discussed above (a = 1, θ = 1/2), therefore, what changes with respect this special case is just the reward function. Then, one can take advantage of a useful property of the Bellman equation (S9): if the solution of a model having rewards r i (s, a) are Q * i (s, a i ) and V * i (s), then, the new solutions of a system where all the rewards are multiplied by the same factor a become aQ * i (s, a i ) and aV * i (s), and the optimal policies do not change. As a consequence, the conditions of existence presented before are still valid for all the parameters satisfying 1 − δ < 2θ/α ≤ 1, while all the value and quality functions are re-scaled by the resource abundance a.
To evaluate the optimal policies in the other three cases, one has to compute the quality functions of the individual i when it plays as proposer, Q * i (ih, e), and Q * i (ih, u), indeed the optimal policy depends on these two quantities, with probability η,
where, with probability 1 − η, the health update is the step function H[r − 1/2], while, with probability η, the health is instead randomly chosen according to a Bernoulli variable which is 1 with probability ρ or 0 otherwise. For η = 0 the previous model is recovered (for simplicity we consider θ = 1/2). The opposite case, η = 1, defines a game in which there is no correlation between the amount of food obtained from the sharing task and how the health will be updated, as if the type of resource does not affect the animal health. This absence of correlation, in turn, implies that the amount of resource gathered at the next episode does not depend on the outcome of sharing task. In the main text, it is claimed that the link between sharing and gathering is a crucial ingredient to have generosity, therefore, one can expect that uncoupling the two tasks by increasing η, inequity aversion tends to disappears. This is shown in Figure S2a : the value of discount factor above which the optimal solution is being generous, which we call selfishness threshold γ * , is numerically computed and plotted as a function of the "noise" η. It has been tested that those lines are independent of the value of ρ. The panel shows that increasing the probability that the health is randomly updated η, the parameter-space volume in which the optimal strategy is generosity tends to decrease (i.e. γ * increases), eventually reaching γ * = 1, which implies that being fair is always inefficient. Consistently, it can be easily proven that the completely-random case, η = 1, always leads to a selfish scenario. Indeed, the quality functions of the player playing as proposer i are: Q * i (ih, u) = δ/2 + Q * i (ih, e) for any parameter choice, implying that π * ih = 0. It is worth mentioning that the random case with q = 1 (the proposer is always the same player) and ρ = 1 (there is only one health state and, at each step the quantity of resource to divide is fixed to a) can be described as composed of only one state. This recovers the classical dictator game, in which one fixed player has to choose how to share a fixed amount of resource with a second passive player, Figure S2b . In this case one clearly has always the selfish strategy as the optimal solution. : the value of the discount factor γ at the boundary of the generosity phase, i.e. the generosity threshold γ * , is plotted as a function of the probability that the health is randomly updated, η, for four choices of the other two parameters s and δ. Above the lines, the optimal strategy is being generous, while below it can be the selfish or the exploitation one. The four lines are interpolations of numerically found values of γ * , varying the "noise" η, and fixing the specialization s, and the inequity δ. Specifically, the Markov game is solved with a dynamic-programming algorithm. Panel (b): classical dictator game with two actions, which can be seen as a particular case of the generalized gathering-sharing model with s = 1, η = 1, ρ = 1. One fixed proposer has a certain "capital" of resource a which has to be divided with a passive bystander. The two actions are the usual ones: being fair and splitting the capital in equal parts, or selfish and keeping a larger fraction. After the division the game can repeat with the same rules (neither the proposer change nor the amount of resource).
